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The Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc v Robins clarified the “concrete-
ness” element of the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. The Court explained 
that while some statutory violations are concrete injuries, others are merely proce-
dural and insufficient for standing without additional allegations of concrete 
harms. Federal courts have divided on the decision’s application to many statutory 
causes of action, including the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). While some courts view FDCPA mandatory dis-
closure violations as concrete injuries if they threaten the plaintiff’s concrete inter-
ests, others view the violations as merely procedural and never sufficient for stand-
ing. This Comment argues for a third view, that an FDCPA mandatory disclosure 
violation is always a concrete injury regardless of whether it causes the plaintiff to 
suffer or risk subjective harm. That conclusion flows from a new view: applying 
Spokeo to statutory violations turns on whether the provision at issue has a deterrent 
or a compensatory function. Because the FDCPA’s text, remedies, statutory purpose, 
legislative history, and treatment in other contexts indicate that it is deterrent, vio-
lations of its mandatory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A debt collector sent Paula Casillas a demand to pay a debt.1 
The letter disclosed her right to verify the debt under the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act2 (FDCPA), but failed to specify that 
she had to request verification in writing to avoid waiving her 
right.3 That failure violated the statute,4 so Casillas proceeded to 
file a class action.5 Casillas and the debt collector resolved their 
dispute, jointly moving for class certification and preliminary ap-
proval of a settlement.6 But the court threw Casillas’s claim out 
soon after. Casillas’s complaint lacked what the court considered 
a crucial statement: that the nondisclosure caused her harm.7 
The rationale in Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc8 
was based on the standing doctrine. In order for a federal court to 
hear a case, the plaintiff must show that they have standing.9 The 
recent Supreme Court case Spokeo, Inc v Robins10 elaborated on 
“injury in fact,” a core component of standing. After Spokeo, an 
injury in fact requires an injury that is both concrete and partic-
ularized.11 Concrete injuries “must actually exist”; they are “real, 
and not abstract.”12 Congress has a role in deciding which injuries 
are concrete, but not every statutory cause of action successfully 
 
 1 Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, 926 F3d 329, 332 (7th Cir 2019). 
 2 Pub L No 95-109, 91 Stat 874 (1977), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1692–92p. 
 3 Casillas, 926 F3d at 332. 
 4 See 15 USC § 1692g. 
 5 Casillas, 926 F3d at 332. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id at 331, 334. 
 8 926 F3d 329 (7th Cir 2019). 
 9 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–60 (1992). 
 10 136 S Ct 1540 (2016). 
 11 Id at 1548. 
 12 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
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creates a concrete injury.13 On the other hand, “[f]or an injury to 
be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.’”14 Thus, Spokeo distinguished concreteness from 
particularity—two requirements that the courts often previously 
applied as if they were one and the same.15 
While the particularity prong has caused few problems, the 
application of the concreteness prong to consumer protection stat-
utes remains unclear. In less than four years, Spokeo has caused 
a multitude of circuit splits on whether various violations of con-
sumer protection statutes give rise to concrete injuries.16 As a re-
sult, defendants should challenge standing whenever plaintiffs 
sue for violations of consumer protection statutes.17 The Seventh 
Circuit created one of these circuit splits in Casillas by holding 
that violations of the mandatory disclosure provisions of the 
FDCPA are never concrete injuries if the plaintiff does not allege 
an additional harm.18 As a result, Casillas’s failure to allege some 
other injury doomed her claim. The Sixth Circuit, in contrast, 
treats violations of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure provisions 
as concrete injuries in certain cases.19 
Resolving how Spokeo applies to the FDCPA is important. 
First, the FDCPA is one of America’s most critical consumer pro-
tection statutes. It regulates a vast, multibillion-dollar industry 
that is notorious for consumer abuse. As such, it generates thou-
sands of lawsuits every year.20 Settling FDCPA standing would 
clarify the applicable requirements for practitioners and courts. 
Second, and more “concretely,” standing matters to ordinary vic-
tims of abusive debt collectors. Tightening standing requirements 
 
 13 See id at 1549. 
 14 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 560 n 1. 
 15 See William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 S Ct Rev 197, 215. 
 16 See Jennifer A. Jackson and Matthew M. Petersen, Spokeo IV: Cert Denied and 
the Circuit Splits Left Behind (Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP, Feb 14, 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/ZY7K-3PKV; Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of 
Intangible Harms, 118 Mich L Rev 471, 480 (2019) (noting that “[i]n Spokeo’s wake, lower 
courts have struggled to adopt a consistent methodology for identifying intangible concrete 
injuries across a range of alleged violations of comparable consumer protection laws” and 
providing a taxonomy of the failures). 
 17 See Loren Flath, Note, No Harm, No Foul? How Companies Can Limit their Lia-
bility Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes After Spokeo, 46 Rutgers L Rec 125, 
144 (2019) (arguing for the use of such a strategy). 
 18 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 & n 4. 
 19 See Macy v GC Services Limited Partnership, 897 F3d 747, 761 (6th Cir 2018) 
(holding that the defendant’s failure to indicate that disputes must be submitted in writing 
was sufficient to create standing for the plaintiffs). 
 20 See Part I.B.4. 
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will cause more victims to lose on technicalities like Casillas did. 
Because failure to show standing prevents liability, heightening 
standing barriers may decrease debt collectors’ incentives to 
avoid abuse ex ante. Finally, because this circuit split is one of a 
large family of similar splits, solutions to the concreteness ques-
tion in the FDCPA context could apply analogically to other con-
sumer protection statutes. This Comment proposes and examines 
a potential solution to this timely circuit split. 
Courts should hold that all violations of the FDCPA’s man-
datory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries for purposes of 
injury in fact. In other words, plaintiffs need only allege a statu-
tory violation with respect to these provisions, not that they suf-
fered any subjective harm, to establish a concrete injury. For ex-
ample, plaintiffs need not show that they suffered any financial 
loss or mental suffering from the FDCPA violation to have stand-
ing. Because of that feature, I refer to this as the “objective solution” 
to standing under the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements. 
The objective solution to FDCPA mandatory disclosure 
standing relies on and illustrates a novel interpretation of how 
Spokeo applies to standing when statutes are violated. Under my 
“functional” reading of Spokeo, violations of statutes that regulate 
industries through deterrence give rise to objective concrete inju-
ries sufficient for standing without subjective harm. On the other 
hand, violations of statutes that compensate plaintiffs for subjec-
tive injuries are not concrete injuries without a resulting subjec-
tive, concrete injury that is also asserted in the complaint. I argue 
that this functional framework for evaluating whether statutory 
violations are concrete injuries is intuitive and consistent with 
both the spirit and text of Spokeo, including its descriptions of 
Congress’s role, the purpose of standing, and listed examples. 
The functional reading of Spokeo, when applied to the 
FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements, leads to the objec-
tive approach to standing under them. Because the provisions are 
designed to regulate and deter, not to compensate, plaintiffs’ 
claims arising under them need only assert that the defendant 
violated the requirements with respect to the plaintiff to satisfy 
Spokeo. The text, structure, and purpose of the FDCPA all 
strongly suggest that its mandatory disclosure provisions are reg-
ulatory, not compensatory, so all violations of these requirements 
should be actionable regardless of whether a subjective injury re-
sults. Spokeo instructs the courts to defer to that congressional 
judgment. The objective solution also resolves an inconsistency 
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between how injury in fact applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory 
disclosure and misrepresentation provisions. Finally, the objec-
tive approach sets proper incentives for defendants. 
The functional reading of Spokeo has utility beyond the 
FDCPA. It could provide a way for courts to evaluate standing 
under the myriad other consumer protection statutes on which 
there are current circuit splits. It also provides Congress clear 
guidance on how to design consumer protection statutes to make 
violations of them concrete (and how not to do so). 
In Part I, I explain standing doctrine and the structure of the 
FDCPA. Part II describes the federal courts’ different views on 
whether violations of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure provi-
sions are ever concrete injuries. Part III proposes the objective 
approach as a solution to the circuit split and explains its merits. 
Part III also outlines how standing under other statutes could be 
addressed analogously by applying the functional reading of 
Spokeo. 
I.  BACKGROUND: STANDING, SPOKEO, AND THE FDCPA 
A. Standing and Spokeo 
The US Constitution limits the “judicial Power” to “Cases” 
and “Controversies.”21 The standing doctrine arises from that lim-
itation.22 To be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a case 
must meet three requirements that form an “irreducible constitu-
tional minimum.”23 First, the plaintiff must show “an injury in 
fact,” which is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is 
both “concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.”24 “Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of” so 
that the former can be “fairly” traced to the latter.25 Third, it must 
be “likely,” not “merely speculative,” that the court could redress 
the plaintiff’s injury.26 The standing doctrine protects the separa-
tion of powers by ensuring that the courts stick to their proper 
domain of cases and controversies.27 
 
 21 US Const Art III § 2, cl 1. 
 22 See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 559–60 (1992). 
 23 Id at 560. 
 24 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 25 Id (quotation marks omitted). 
 26 Lujan, 504 US at 561 (quotation marks omitted). 
 27 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1547. 
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The injury-in-fact requirement raises a vexing problem: “To 
what extent is [the injury-in-fact requirement] shaped by ordi-
nary law, and therefore by Congress, and to what extent is it in-
stead hard-coded in Article III?”28 In other words, what role does 
Congress have in determining which injuries are sufficient for 
standing, and is there a constitutional constraint on that role? 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on that question was in 
two minds before Spokeo. In some cases, statutes created stand-
ing for plaintiffs by creating causes of action. In Lujan v Defenders 
of Wildlife,29 the Supreme Court said that standing “may exist 
solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of 
which creates standing.”30 Congress can pass statutes to “elevat[e] 
to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto inju-
ries that were previously inadequate in law.”31 In doing so, it 
“broaden[s] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support 
of standing.”32 
However, Lujan is actually an example of the Supreme Court 
holding that a statutory violation that Congress explicitly made 
sufficient for suit was insufficient to create standing.33 In that 
case, the Department of the Interior amended its regulations to 
no longer require federal agencies to consult it on impacts to en-
dangered species when acting abroad.34 Various environmental-
ists sued, seeking an injunction ordering the Department of the 
Interior return to the old rule.35 They contended that they had 
standing under a provision of the Endangered Species Act allow-
ing “any person” to sue “to enjoin any person, including the 
United States” from violating the statute.36 
The Court rejected the theory. Even when Congress creates a 
cause of action like the one in the Endangered Species Act, plain-
tiffs suing under it might not satisfy the injury-in-fact require-
ment. The statutory violation from the repealed regulation that 
the Lujan plaintiffs alleged was a “generally available grievance 
about government,” not an injury in fact, so the plaintiffs lacked 
 
 28 Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 199 (cited in note 15). 
 29 504 US 555 (1992). 
 30 Id at 578 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Warth v Sedlin, 
422 US 490, 500 (1975). 
 31 Lujan, 504 US at 578. 
 32 Sierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727, 738 (1972). 
 33 Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 204 (cited in note 15). 
 34 See Lujan, 504 US at 558–59. 
 35 Id at 559. 
 36 Id at 571–72, quoting 16 USC § 1540(g). 
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standing.37 The Supreme Court criticized the court below for rea-
soning that “the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by 
congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-con-
tained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive observe the 
procedures required by law.”38 Even when federal courts act “at 
the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury require-
ment,” they violate Article III.39 Lujan therefore clarified that not 
all plaintiffs suing under statutory causes of action adequately 
allege an injury in fact. 
Thus, a hard problem arose in standing doctrine. On the one 
hand, Congress could make some injuries concrete by enacting 
statutory causes of action. For example, Lujan explicitly did not 
apply to statutes that “create[ ] a concrete private interest in the 
outcome of a suit against a private party for the Government’s 
benefit, by providing a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.”40 
On the other hand, Congress could sometimes fail to create stand-
ing even when it attempted to do so, as it did in the Endangered 
Species Act. How to classify which statutes succeeded in their at-
tempts to create injury in fact and which failed was a question 
with no clear answer.41 
The Supreme Court faced this paradox squarely in Spokeo. In 
Spokeo, the defendant operated an online search engine for per-
sonal information that provided false information about the 
named plaintiff, Thomas Robins.42 Robins then sued under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act43 (FCRA), which includes a private 
right of action.44 The district court dismissed his complaint for 
lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit reversed.45 The Supreme 
Court reversed again, faulting the Ninth Circuit for “fail[ing] to 
 
 37 Lujan, 504 US at 573. 
 38 Id (emphasis in original). 
 39 Id at 576. See also Summers v Earth Island Institute, 555 US 488, 497 (2009) 
(“[T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot 
be removed by statute.”). 
 40 Lujan, 504 US at 573. 
 41 See Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 209 (cited in note 15). 
 42 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1544. 
 43 Pub L No 91-508, 84 Stat 1128, codified at 15 USC § 1681 et seq. 
 44 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1545–46. Note that the FCRA, like the FDCPA, is an 
important consumer protection statute that limits the activities of debt collectors. See 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: BCFP Annual 
Report 2019 *8 (Mar 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/K9NP-BBY2. 
 45 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1546. 
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fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness and partic-
ularization” in injury in fact.46 The Court described concreteness 
in the following way: “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that 
is, it must actually exist. When we have used the adjective ‘con-
crete,’ we have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—
‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’ Concreteness, therefore, is quite different 
from particularization.”47 On the other hand, “[f]or an injury to be 
‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and in-
dividual way.’”48 Showing a violation of the plaintiff’s personal in-
terests is not enough to show concreteness, though.49 Spokeo 
harmed Robins personally by providing false information about 
him in particular, so particularity was not an issue for Robins’s 
case.50 
While the Court claimed that it had repeatedly emphasized 
the distinction between concreteness and particularity,51 that 
claim is dubious.52 In prior decisions, the Court used both words 
but often did so interchangeably. The newly emphasized distinc-
tion once again raised the question of which statutory causes of 
action successfully create concrete injuries. Rather than resolving 
the tension that had built up over that question in earlier cases, 
though, the Court attempted to have its cake and eat it too. 
On the one hand, it emphasized the role of Congress in iden-
tifying concrete intangible injuries, such as violations of free 
speech or free exercise.53 The Court explained that “[i]n determin-
ing whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, both 
history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.”54 
There are two ways to show that an intangible injury is concrete. 
The first is to show that the injury has a “close relationship” to a 
 
 46 Id at 1550. 
 47 Id at 1548 (citations omitted). 
 48 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 560 n 1. 
 49 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548. 
 50 Id at 1550. 
 51 See id at 1548. 
 52 Baude, 2016 S Ct Rev at 215 (cited in note 15) (“The word ‘concrete’ had appeared 
in the Court’s standing cases before . . . [b]ut . . . had not before been given any independ-
ent definition or meaning.”); Justiciability—Class Action Standing—Spokeo, Inc. v. Rob-
ins, 130 Harv L Rev 437, 444 (2016) (“[Spokeo][ ] . . . is the first Supreme Court case to 
pull apart the concreteness and particularization prongs . . . in order to deny standing.”). 
 53 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549. 
 54 Id. 
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harm that was historically actionable at common law.55 The sec-
ond is to show that the plaintiff’s injury has been identified by 
Congress as sufficiently concrete for standing: 
[B]ecause Congress is well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judg-
ment is [ ] instructive and important. Thus, we said in Lujan 
that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cogniza-
ble injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously 
inadequate in law.” . . . Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence in that case explained that “Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will 
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”56 
In cases where Congress has defined a new concrete injury, 
the plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified” to have standing.57 From the Court’s lan-
guage, a reasonable reader could infer that the courts should de-
fer to Congress’s creations of causes of action. 
However, the Court also made clear that a statutory violation 
is not necessarily sufficient for a concrete injury. Plaintiffs do not 
“automatically” have concrete injuries “whenever a statute grants 
a person a statutory right” and purports to create a cause of action 
to remedy its violation.58 “Article III standing requires a concrete 
injury even in the context of a statutory violation.”59 In particular, 
“bare procedural violation[s]” of statutes that are “divorced from 
any concrete harm” are not concrete injuries even if a statute per-
mits plaintiffs to sue in response to them.60 The Court’s example 
of a bare procedural injury in the context of the FCRA is that of a 
credit reporter reporting an incorrect zip code.61 That being said, 
the Court expressly did not decide whether any other violations 
of consumer protection statutes are insufficiently concrete with-
out an additional showing of injury.62 It did clarify, though, that 
showing a risk of concrete harm, such as those posed by libel, 
 
 55 Id. Because modern consumer protection statutes often create causes of action that 
are not especially similar to those at common law, such as violations of mandatory disclo-
sure provisions, this is unlikely to be helpful to consumer protection plaintiffs. 
 56 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (majority), 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
 57 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550. 
 62 Id at 1550 n 8. 
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slander, and violations of freedom of information statutes, can be 
sufficient without showing an additional injury.63 
Thus, the two-sided nature of standing doctrine with regard 
to statutory violations continues. Spokeo continued to hold that 
Congress has a role in identifying concrete injuries, but also that 
not all such identifications succeed. By failing to resolve the  
tension in its prior cases, the Court added further confusion in a 
decision intended to resolve it. The key questions from before 
Spokeo remain: Which statutory causes of action identify concrete 
injuries and which do not? How should courts decide? Those prob-
lems are particularly vexing in the context of consumer protection 
law, the subject of Spokeo itself. Circuits have subsequently split 
on the questions of which violations of consumer protection stat-
utes are sufficiently concrete to confer standing.64 
B. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 
This Comment focuses on the circuit split over the mandatory 
disclosure provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a 
major federal consumer protection statute. The FDCPA aims to 
“eliminate abusive debt collection practices,” protect fair debt col-
lectors from “competitive[ ] disadvantage[ ],” and “promote con-
sistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection 
abuses.”65 Its requirements can be grouped into two major catego-
ries: procedural protections for consumers and regulations on 
debt collector communications with the public.66 The two catego-
ries work together to achieve the statute’s consumer protective 
goals: they give consumers rights under the statute and ensure 
that consumers know that they can exercise those rights. Neither 
the undisclosed ability to exercise rights nor formal disclosures 
without accompanying rights help consumers much. The FDCPA 
is enforced through both private lawsuits and administrative 
remedies. Its private right of action has enabled a great deal of 
 
 63 Id at 1549–50, citing Federal Election Commission v Akins, 524 US 11, 20–25 
(1998), and Public Citizen v Department of Justice, 491 US 440, 449 (1989). 
 64 These include splits arising under the FDCPA, the FCRA, the Telephone Con-
sumer Protection Act, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, the Video Protection 
Privacy Act, and the Consumer Credit Protection Act. See generally Jackson and Petersen, 
Spokeo IV: Cert Denied (cited in note 16). The Supreme Court does not appear to feel a 
pressing need to resolve them.  
 65 15 USC § 1692(e). 
 66 Note that debt collectors for purposes of the FDCPA include both natural and legal 
“person[s].” See 15 USC § 1692a(6). 
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litigation.67 This Comment focuses, in particular, on how Spokeo 
applies to the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements, but 
comprehending the Act as a whole helps to understand the disclo-
sure requirements. 
1. Procedural protections. 
The FDCPA provides important procedural protections for 
consumers confronted by debt collectors. They include the rights 
to dispute a debt and to request the name and address of the orig-
inal creditor within thirty days after receiving a notice from the 
debt collector.68 The right to request information on the original 
creditor is important because debts are often transferred between 
many creditors, so the consumer might have difficulty verifying 
or disputing the debt without it.69 Upon receiving notice that a 
consumer is exercising one of those rights, the debt collector must 
stop collecting the debt or the disputed portion of it until the col-
lector receives the requested documentation and sends it to the 
consumer.70 If the consumer does not make a request within the 
thirty-day period, the collector may continue all legal collection 
efforts.71 
2. Regulations on communications. 
The FDCPA also extensively regulates collector-consumer 
communications. These restrictions take five main forms: manda-
tory disclosures, bans on misrepresentations, bans on unfair prac-
tices, protections of debtor privacy, and restrictions on the scope 
of the debt collector’s communications with the debtor. 
This Comment focuses on standing under the FDCPA’s two 
major mandatory disclosure provisions. First, 15 USC § 1692e(11) 
requires the debt collector to disclose that it is a debt collector in 
all communications with the consumer, with the exception of legal 
pleadings.72 In the first communication, the debt collector must 
also disclose “that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt 
 
 67 See Part I.B.4. 
 68 15 USC § 1692g(a). 
 69 See Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary Tales of 
Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 Loyola Consumer L Rev 355, 359–60 (2012). 
 70 15 USC § 1692g(b). 
 71 15 USC § 1692g(b). 
 72 15 USC § 1692e(11). 
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and that any information obtained will be used for that pur-
pose.”73 Second, within five days of the initial communication with 
a consumer, the debt collector must send a “notice of debt” which 
includes more extensive disclosures of information and rights un-
der § 1692g(a). These include the amount of the debt, the name of 
the creditor, that the debt will be presumed valid unless the con-
sumer disputes it in writing within thirty days, and the rights to 
dispute the debt or request the name and address of the creditor 
in writing within thirty days.74 If a consumer does not receive the 
notice and subsequently follow the prescribed procedures, they 
may accidentally waive the right to dispute the debt or receive 
creditor information.75 
Aside from mandatory disclosures, the FDCPA prohibits 
broadly defined categories of abusive debt collection practices. 
These include “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation 
or means” for debt collection, including more than a dozen spe-
cific, nonexhaustive examples.76 The FDCPA also bans “conduct 
the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse 
any person in connection with the collection of a debt”77 and “un-
fair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any 
debt,” again with a list of specific, nonexhaustive examples.78 
Other provisions of the FDCPA attempt to prevent debt col-
lectors from humiliating consumers by communicating with third 
parties. For example, debt collectors may only communicate with 
the consumer, the creditor, and the attorneys of the parties in-
volved except to find location information.79 
 
 73 15 USC § 1692e(11). 
 74 15 USC § 1692g(a). 
 75 See, for example, Casillas, 926 F3d at 341 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing en banc) (“[P]eople might not appreciate the need for a written record of their dealings 
with the debt collector and thus without a reminder that they must reduce their concerns 
to writing, they are likely to forfeit the important substantive rights the Act provides for 
them.”). 
 76 15 USC § 1692e. 
 77 15 USC § 1692d. 
 78 15 USC § 1692f. 
 79 See 15 USC § 1692c(b), incorporating by reference 15 USC § 1692b. Location in-
formation means “a consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or 
his place of employment.” 15 USC § 1692a(7). A debt collector contacting someone besides 
the consumer to discover the location information must “identify himself, state that he is 
confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if ex-
pressly requested, identify his employer.” 15 USC § 1692b(1). The collector may not reveal 
that the consumer owes any debt or send written materials indicating that it is a debt 
collector. See 15 USC § 1692b(2)–(5). 
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Finally, the Act prevents debt collectors from contacting con-
sumers at all in certain circumstances unless they have permis-
sion to do so. For example, there is a presumption that collectors 
cannot contact consumers at inconvenient times or after the con-
sumer requests that the collector stop, subject to enumerated 
exceptions.80 
3. Remedies. 
Violations of the rights granted under the FDCPA can be 
remedied either through private action or administrative enforce-
ment. First, the FDCPA creates a private right of action. Actual 
damages sustained by a plaintiff can be collected in all lawsuits.81 
Other damages can be added to actual damages at the court’s dis-
cretion.82 In individual actions, the plaintiff can collect discretion-
ary statutory damages of up to $1,000.83 In class actions, named 
plaintiffs can recover statutory damages of up to $1,000, and all 
other class members can collectively recover up to the lesser of 
$500,000 or 1 percent of the debt collector’s net worth.84 When 
judging discretionary liability in class actions, courts consider 
“the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt col-
lector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt 
collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the ex-
tent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was inten-
tional.”85 Moreover, successful plaintiffs in any FDCPA action 
have the right to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.86 In all 
FDCPA actions, an affirmative defense exists if the debt collector 
shows that the violation was unintentional and happened not-
withstanding reasonable error prevention procedures.87 
In addition to the private right of action, the FDCPA provides 
various administrative remedies. All violations of the FDCPA not 
committed to the jurisdiction of other agencies are deemed viola-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission Act88 (FTC Act), so the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the FDCPA.89 All of 
 
 80 See 15 USC § 1692c(a)(1), (c). 
 81 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(1). 
 82 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2). 
 83 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(A). 
 84 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
 85 15 USC § 1692k(b)(2). 
 86 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(3). 
 87 See 15 USC § 1692k(c). 
 88 Pub L No 63-203, 38 Stat 717 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 41 et seq. 
 89 See 15 USC § 1692l(a). 
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the FTC’s powers under the FTC Act may be used in FDCPA en-
forcement.90 Moreover, all violations of the FDCPA may be pur-
sued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).91 In 
some specific contexts, the FDCPA is also enforced by federal 
banking agencies, the National Credit Union Administration, the 
Department of Transportation, and the Department of  
Agriculture.92 
4. FDCPA litigation. 
The FDCPA’s private right of action has led to a great deal of 
civil litigation. Debt collection is a multibillion-dollar industry in 
the United States.93 Third-party debt collectors are attempting to 
collect from roughly 28 percent of American consumers with a 
credit file.94 The average consumer contacted by at least one debt 
collector has more than three debts being pursued.95 Debt collec-
tion typically begins with a creditor giving up on collecting a de-
linquent payment, at which point it hires a third-party debt col-
lector who works on contingency.96 If the debt collector is 
unsuccessful in collecting, the debt will be sold to a debt buyer at 
a heavy discount.97 Debt buyers can then sell the debt on to other 
debt buyers, and so on and so forth.98 Even the debt buying mar-
ket is now very large; the FTC found that nine debt buyers spent 
nearly $6.5 billion buying debt with a face value of almost $143 
billion in 2008.99 
Unsurprisingly, not all of those debt collectors treat consum-
ers well. Debt collection is the most common source of consumer 
complaints to both the FTC and the CFPB.100 There are serious 
 
 90 See 15 USC § 1692l(a). 
 91 See 15 USC § 1692l(b)(6). 
 92 See 15 USC § 1692l(b). 
 93 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 
BCFP Annual Report 2019 at *8 (cited in note 44). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 See Fox, 24 Loyola Consumer L Rev at 358–59 (cited in note 69). 
 97 See id at 359. 
 98 Id at 359–60. 
 99 Federal Trade Commission, The Structure and Practices of the Debt Buying Indus-
try *8 (Jan 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/4PPM-7SAJ. 
 100 National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Debt Collection Facts *1 (Feb 2018), 
archived at https://perma.cc/2YJ2-VPE8. 
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questions over whether the FDCPA is currently capable of curb-
ing widespread abuse by debt collectors.101 
The FDCPA created a perfect storm for large-scale class ac-
tion litigation. It has a private right of action with significant stat-
utory damages and is aimed at a deep-pocketed industry that tar-
gets consumers by the thousands. As a result, FDCPA litigation 
has increased significantly over the last two decades, and around 
ten thousand lawsuits under the FDCPA are filed annually.102 
Because private FDCPA litigation is a major regulator of the 
debt collection industry, and because all plaintiffs must show 
standing, either relaxing or tightening standing requirements 
significantly would affect debt collectors’ potential liability. As a 
result, changes in standing requirements would likely lead to 
changes in debt collectors’ conduct. Resolving disagreements on 
standing under the FDCPA is thus important not only for justici-
ability doctrine but also for consumer protection efforts. 
Moreover, while I focus on standing under the mandatory dis-
closure provisions of the FDCPA, a successful solution to that is-
sue could be applied analogously to the circuit splits involving 
other consumer protection statutes. In this way, it would contrib-
ute to solving the current problems that arise from the intersec-
tion of consumer protection laws and Spokeo. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
The circuit courts are currently divided on how to apply 
Spokeo to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the 
FDCPA—specifically, whether nondisclosures can be concrete in-
juries without more. The Seventh Circuit recognized that its opin-
ion in Casillas created a split with the Sixth Circuit by ruling in 
the opposite direction on materially identical facts.103 In this Part, 
I explain the arguments on each side of this split. The Sixth Cir-
cuit holds that the FDCPA makes nondisclosure alone a concrete 
injury in some circumstances, while the Seventh Circuit holds 
that without more, it never is.104 
 
 101 See Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Col-
lection After FDCPA, 79 S Cal L Rev 711, 729 (2006) (alleging that the FDCPA simply 
forced collectors to find a new business model to continue harassing consumers). 
 102 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: CFPB 
Annual Report 2016 *15 (Mar 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/PQ4V-8VMC. 
 103 Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 & n 4. See also id at 340 (Wood dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 104 The circuit split has a third side: the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in 
Church v Accretive Health, Inc, 654 F Appx 990 (11th Cir 2016). Church analogizes the 
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A. The Sixth Circuit’s View: Nondisclosure Is (Sometimes) a 
Concrete Injury 
The Sixth Circuit faced the problem of how to reconcile 
Spokeo and the FDCPA in Macy v GC Services Limited Partner-
ship.105 The plaintiffs, Wilbur Macy and Pamela Stowe, alleged 
that a letter sent from the defendant debt collector failed to dis-
close that individuals must dispute debts in writing to assert their 
rights under the FDCPA, violating the FDCPA’s disclosure re-
quirements.106 To determine whether the violation was a concrete 
injury, the court began by analyzing Spokeo. It pointed to the lan-
guage in Spokeo indicating that plaintiffs need not allege addi-
tional harm when statutory violations are sufficient for injury in 
fact.107 It recognized, though, that Spokeo also clarified that not 
all statutory violations are sufficient for injury in fact without ad-
ditional allegations of harm.108 
The court’s solution to this now-familiar dilemma was to fo-
cus on whether Congress created the procedural right to protect 
 
FDCPA disclosure issue to Havens Realty Corp v Coleman, 455 US 363 (1982), in which 
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had standing to sue a landlord that falsely said it 
had no apartments available for her but told a prospective white renter that units were 
available, violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Church, 654 F Appx at 993–94, citing 
Havens Realty, 455 US at 368, 372–73. The FHA creates an enforceable right to truthful 
information, and violations of it are injuries in fact sufficient for standing without addi-
tional allegations. See Church, 654 F Appx at 994, citing Havens Realty, 455 US at 373–
74. The Eleventh Circuit extended Havens Realty to the FDCPA, claiming that the FDCPA 
created an enforceable right to receive information through mandatory disclosures and 
that violations of it from nondisclosure are sufficient for standing. See Church, 654 F Appx 
at 994–95. 
 However, Church did not seriously grapple with Spokeo, which makes clear that not 
all violations of statutory rights are sufficient to create standing. The Eleventh Circuit 
itself seemingly rejected Church’s rationale in a different context. See Nicklaw v CitiMort-
gage, Inc, 839 F3d 998, 1002–03 (11th Cir 2016). See also Lyshe v Levy, 854 F3d 855, 859–
60 (6th Cir 2017) (explaining the tension between the Eleventh Circuit cases). Moreover, 
unlike the FDCPA, the FHA only creates private rights of action for failures to disclose on 
the basis of protected characteristics; the injury in an FHA case is discrimination related 
in a way that the injury in an FDCPA case is not. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 338. Both the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits have explicitly rejected Church. See Lyshe, 854 F3d at 859–
61; Casillas, 926 F3d at 338, 338–39 n 7. Because this does not appear to be a probable 
route taken by the courts in the future, I do not address it in detail. The idea that any 
statutory cause of action is sufficient for a concrete injury is an unpromising reading of 
both Havens Realty and Spokeo. 
 105 897 F3d 747 (6th Cir 2018). 
 106 Id at 751. 
 107 Id at 753, citing Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1548–49. 
 108 Macy, 897 F3d at 754. 
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a concrete interest and whether the violation threatened that con-
crete interest.109 This approach borrows from widely cited deci-
sions by the Second and Ninth Circuits.110 As the court summarized: 
Spokeo categorized statutory violations as falling into two 
broad categories: (1) where the violation of a procedural right 
granted by statute is sufficient in and of itself to constitute 
concrete injury in fact because Congress conferred the proce-
dural right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and the 
procedural violation presents a material risk of real harm to 
that concrete interest; and (2) where there is a ‘‘bare’’ proce-
dural violation that does not meet this standard, in which 
case a plaintiff must allege “additional harm beyond the one 
Congress has identified.”111 
The Second Circuit’s rationale for adopting this test stemmed 
from a line in Summers v Earth Island Institute,112 quoting Lujan, 
that the court determined was still good law.113 “Only a ‘person 
who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete 
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy.’”114 However, 
whether that line can support the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
of Spokeo is at least questionable.115 
 
 109 See id at 754–55, citing Strubel v Comenity Bank, 842 F3d 181, 189 (2d Cir 2016), 
and Robins v Spokeo, Inc, 867 F3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir 2017) (Spokeo II). 
 110 See Strubel, 842 F3d at 189 (discussing the scope of “bare procedural violation[s]” 
as applied to the Truth in Lending Act); Spokeo II, 867 F3d at 1113–14 (assessing rights 
created by the FCRA). Note that neither Strubel nor Spokeo II involved the FDCPA, so 
they are not part of the split that is the main topic of this Comment. 
 111 Macy, 897 F3d at 756, quoting Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original). 
 112 555 US 488 (2009). 
 113 See Strubel, 842 F3d at 189, quoting Summers, 555 US at 496. 
 114 Summers, 555 US at 496, quoting Lujan, 555 US at 572 n 7 (emphasis omitted). 
 115 There are several issues with the Second Circuit’s extrapolation from this sen-
tence. First, the language in Summers and Lujan preceded the development of the clear 
distinction between concreteness and particularity that created the issues this Comment 
is concerned with. 
 Second, in both Summers and Lujan, the language discusses the plaintiffs’ supposed 
procedural right to force the government follow its own procedures, which bears little re-
semblance beyond the term “procedural” to rights granted in the causes of action of con-
sumer protection statutes. See Summers, 555 US at 496–97; Lujan, 504 US at 572. 
 Third, and most importantly, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote concurrences for the 
majority-makers in both Lujan and Summers that limit the exact text that the Second 
Circuit cites. For Justice Kennedy, each “case would present different considerations if 
Congress . . . provide[d] redress for a concrete injury ‘giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before,’” Summers, 555 US at 501 (Kennedy concurring), quoting 
Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), exer-
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The questions facing the Sixth Circuit thus became whether 
Congress created the right to disclosure in the FDCPA to protect 
a concrete interest of consumers and whether the defendant 
threatened that interest. The Sixth Circuit answered yes to both 
in Macy. Section 1692g(a)(4)’s requirement for debt collectors to 
disclose that debts must be disputed in writing aims to allow debt-
ors to enforce and understand their rights.116 In particular, non-
disclosure creates a risk of concrete harm from the “possibility of 
an unintentional waiver of FDCPA’s debt-validation rights, in-
cluding suspension of collection of disputed debts under Sec-
tion 1692g(b).”117 The debt collector’s failure to disclose in the par-
ticular case allegedly threatened Macy and Stowe’s interest in 
avoiding waiver.118 It follows that Macy and Stowe had standing.119 
Under the Sixth Circuit’s approach, not all violations of stat-
utory rights are sufficient for concrete injuries, so the approach 
complies with Spokeo. For example, the Sixth Circuit held that 
nondisclosure in violation of the FCRA was insufficient for stand-
ing without additional harm because violations of the disclosure 
requirements of the FCRA create far smaller risks of harm than 
analogous violations of the FDCPA.120 
 
cising “the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation” that are newly suf-
ficient for standing, Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). See also Richard J. Pierce Jr, Comment, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: 
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 Duke L J 1170, 1173, 
1181 (1993) (explaining the failure of much of Lujan to get majority support and the con-
currence’s approval of broad congressional power to create causes of action); Maria Banda, 
Case Comment, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 34 Harv Envir L Rev 321, 328 (2010) 
(“Justice Kennedy broke the tie in Summers . . . by reaffirming his Lujan concurrence that 
Congress must retain enough flexibility to define new injuries.”). The test adopted by the 
Second Circuit, though, plausibly violates this understanding for two reasons. The first is 
that it provides no space for Congress to identify new concrete interests. The second is 
that it requires courts to investigate whether the facts in particular cases threaten the 
concrete interest Congress identified. That eliminates Congress’s power to identify statu-
tory violations that are sufficient alone for standing, which is exactly what Justice Ken-
nedy called to preserve. 
 116 See Macy, 897 F3d at 758. 
 117 Id. Chief Judge Diane Wood made a similar argument dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc in the Seventh Circuit’s Casillas decision. She argued that nondisclo-
sure creates a risk of accidental waiver of rights and the inability to stall collection until 
the debt is verified, which is a concrete injury sufficient for standing under Spokeo. See 
Casillas, 926 F3d at 341–42 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Her ar-
gument shows that the FDCPA’s disclosure interests were designed to protect the concrete 
interests of consumers, so plaintiffs need not allege any additional harm to have standing. 
See id. 
 118 Macy, 897 F3d at 758. 
 119 See id at 761. 
 120 See Huff v TeleCheck Services, Inc, 923 F3d 458, 468 (6th Cir 2019). 
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that a different violation of 
the FDCPA was a bare procedural violation insufficient for stand-
ing. In Hagy v Demers & Adams,121 the plaintiffs fell behind on 
payments on their mobile home and asked the creditor to waive 
any deficiency balance in return for a deed in lieu of foreclosure.122 
The lender agreed and its attorney sent the plaintiffs a letter giv-
ing them “everything they wanted.”123 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs 
sued because the letter did not disclose that it was from a debt 
collector, violating the FDCPA.124 The court held that merely al-
leging a violation of the identification provision was insufficient 
for standing because otherwise Congress would be able to “enact 
an injury into existence, using its lawmaking power to transform 
something that is not remotely harmful into something that is.”125 
The Macy court distinguished the case from Hagy on the grounds 
that there was no risk of harm in the Hagy case, such as the risk 
of double payment, of the type that the mandatory disclosure pre-
vents.126 In other words, Hagy failed the second part of Macy’s 
test. 
B. The Seventh Circuit: Nondisclosure Is Never a Concrete 
Injury 
The Seventh Circuit case Casillas involved a factual setup 
nearly identical to that in Macy, but the court came to a different 
conclusion. As in Macy, the plaintiff received a letter from a debt 
collector that violated § 1692g(a)(4) by failing to note that con-
sumers must dispute debts in writing, not orally.127 The court em-
phasized that Casillas did not allege in her complaint that she 
attempted to dispute the debt or planned to attempt to dispute 
the debt.128 
Writing for the court, Judge Amy Coney Barrett read Spokeo 
differently from the Sixth Circuit. She emphasized the parts of 
Spokeo that explained that congressionally created causes of ac-
tion are not necessarily sufficient for standing.129 Yet, Judge Bar-
rett did not cite the language in Spokeo on which the Sixth Circuit 
 
 121 882 F3d 616 (6th Cir 2018). 
 122 Id at 618–19. 
 123 Id at 622. 
 124 Id at 620–21. 
 125 Hagy, 882 F3d at 622. 
 126 Macy, 897 F3d at 761, citing Hagy, 882 F3d at 621–22. 
 127 Casillas, 926 F3d at 332. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See id at 333, citing Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549. 
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hung its hat: “[T]hat a ‘violation of a procedural right granted by 
statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute in-
jury in fact,’ and ‘in such a case a plaintiff need not allege any 
additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’”130 The 
result was a one-sided reading of a two-sided decision. Spokeo em-
phasized both Congress’s role in identifying injuries in fact and 
the need for judicial limits on it, but the Seventh Circuit looked 
only to the latter. The court held that FDCPA disclosure plaintiffs 
must always allege an additional harm or risk of harm from the 
debt collector’s violation beyond the statutory violation itself to 
have standing.131 Indeed, in dicta, the Seventh Circuit suggested 
that this limitation on standing extends to the mandatory disclo-
sure provisions of all consumer protection statutes.132 
The court applied this interpretation to the facts to deny 
Casillas standing. Because she did not allege that she planned to 
dispute the debt in her complaint, she could not have been im-
peded by the defendant’s failure to disclose. She “was not at any 
risk of losing her statutory rights because there was no prospect 
that she would have tried to exercise them.”133 The court empha-
sized that she did not even plead that she read the deficient no-
tice.134 Because the Seventh Circuit requires mandatory disclo-
sure plaintiffs to allege some other concrete harm beyond the 
statutory violation, Casillas’s case was dismissed.135 
The Seventh Circuit’s requirement does not doom all cases 
under the FDCPA. For example, when a debt collector failed to 
provide any of the required disclosures, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the plaintiff had standing to sue.136 The debtor was concretely 
injured by the debt collector suing her without giving her the ben-
efit of the mandatory disclosures, which would have informed her 
of rights to dispute and to verify the debt and thereby halt the 
 
 130 Macy, 897 F3d at 753, quoting Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (alterations omitted) (em-
phasis in original). 
 131 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 333. 
 132 See id at 332 (“[A] plaintiff cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing 
simply by alleging that the defendant violated a disclosure provision of a consumer-protec-
tion statute.”), citing Groshek v Time Warner Cable, Inc, 865 F3d 884, 887 (7th Cir 2017). 
 133 Casillas, 926 F3d at 334. At least one district court outside of the Seventh Circuit 
has ruled similarly on a parallel rationale. See Jackson v Abendroth & Russell, PC, 207 F 
Supp 3d 945, 953–57 (SD Iowa 2016). 
 134 Casillas, 926 F3d at 335. 
 135 Id at 332–33. 
 136 See Lavallee v Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 932 F3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir 2019). 
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lawsuit.137 Similarly, the Casillas court distinguished the case be-
fore it from a FCRA case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation 
of a right to review a background report before a prospective em-
ployer took adverse action based on it.138 Because the FCRA plain-
tiff’s employer did not give her a copy of the background check 
before firing her, depriving her of the opportunity to respond to 
it, the Seventh Circuit held that she was concretely injured. The 
Casillas court argued that Casillas could not allege “any compa-
rable lost opportunity.”139 That rationale suggests that a plaintiff 
alleging some other injury under the FDCPA involving a lost op-
portunity—such as a failure to disclose the possibility of disputing 
the debt at all—might fare better under the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
proach to standing.140 
Thus, a circuit split now exists on whether a violation of the 
mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA creates a harm 
such that a plaintiff “need not allege any additional harm beyond 
the one identified by Congress” in the statute.141 The split’s root 
lies in an ambiguity in Spokeo itself: its decision to affirm both 
sides of the statutory standing debate created problems identify-
ing which violations of statutorily created rights are sufficient for 
standing without allegations of additional harm and which are 
not.142 The objective approach to FDCPA standing that I propose 
follows from an answer to that deep question that focuses on stat-
utes’ functions. 
III.  RESOLVING THE SPLIT ON CONCRETENESS: THE OBJECTIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
In this Part, I advocate a distinct approach to the problem of 
standing under the FDCPA’s disclosure requirements that helps 
 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 334, citing Robertson v Allied Solutions, 902 F3d 690, 
693–97 (7th Cir 2018). 
 139 Casillas, 926 F3d at 334. 
 140 See Lavallee, 932 F3d at 1053 (holding that the plaintiff had standing when a debt 
collector failed to provide any of the required FDCPA disclosures). However, failing to dis-
close that disputes must be in writing also creates a risk that the plaintiff will be denied 
the opportunity to dispute the debt, but the Seventh Circuit held that that was insufficient 
for standing. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 341–42 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc). 
 141 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original). 
 142 See John L. Brown and Ron Edwards, No One Left Standing: Hagy v. Demers & 
Adams, LLC and Post-Spokeo Standing Under the FDCPA (American Bar Association 
Business Law Today, Nov 15, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7TAN-FB2Q; Baude, 
2016 S Ct Rev at 214–16 (cited in note 15). 
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to resolve the ambiguities that the courts face in the aftermath of 
Spokeo. I propose that whenever debt collectors violate the man-
datory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA, the affected consum-
ers have standing, because Congress chose to make nondisclosure 
a concrete harm regardless of whether the nondisclosure causes 
a subjective harm to an individual plaintiff. In other words, the 
plaintiff need not show that they personally suffered due to non-
disclosure—for example, by being misled, losing an opportunity, 
or being financially harmed—in order to have standing in a man-
datory disclosure action. I call this the “objective approach” be-
cause it does not require the courts to determine whether a plain-
tiff suffered a subjective injury to determine whether she has a 
concrete injury. 
Unlike the Sixth Circuit’s approach, whether a disclosure vi-
olation is a concrete injury under the objective framework does 
not depend on whether the risk posed by the failure to disclose 
was sufficiently grave. Thus, consumers should have standing 
even in hard mandatory disclosure cases like Hagy, in which the 
risk of subjective harm to the consumer is exceptionally slight. 
Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s approach, the objective approach 
provides that a violation of the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure 
provisions is itself a concrete injury and that a consumer suing in 
response to it does not need to allege an additional harm. 
This solution follows from a broader view of how Spokeo 
should be interpreted in cases involving statutory violations. Un-
der this interpretation, when Congress creates a statutory cause 
of action to deter industry activity rather than to compensate in-
dividuals for their losses, a violation of the statute alone is an ob-
jective concrete injury under Spokeo. A plaintiff does not need to 
show any additional harm beyond the violation to have standing. 
When Congress creates causes of action to compensate individu-
als for harms they suffer, though, plaintiffs must show a subjec-
tive harm beyond the mere fact of the statutory violation to have 
standing and obtain compensation. I call this a “functional inter-
pretation” of Spokeo’s application to statutes because it makes the 
question of whether a statutory violation is a concrete injury de-
pend on the function of the statutory provision. 
The objective approach to FDCPA mandatory disclosure 
standing in light of Spokeo has several advantages over alterna-
tives. First, I argue that the functional reading of Spokeo is the 
best approach to the case. Spokeo held that Congress can identify 
concrete harms but that not all statutes creating causes of action 
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do so. The functional approach to Spokeo persuasively shows 
which are which.  
Second, when the functional approach is applied to the 
FDCPA, it becomes clear that all violations of the mandatory dis-
closure provisions are concrete injuries. The text, structure, and 
legislative history of the FDCPA all support the theory that the 
mandatory disclosure provisions are deterrent, not compensatory. 
Moreover, the objective approach reconciles an inconsistency in 
how standing doctrine applies to the FDCPA’s nondisclosure and 
misrepresentation provisions. The latter have long been governed 
by an objective standard that does not require showing subjective 
harm. Finally, the objective approach creates proper incentives 
for debt collectors, encouraging them to fulfill their FDCPA obli-
gations and discouraging them from targeting unsophisticated 
consumers. 
I conclude this Part by showing how courts—when confronted 
by similar problems under other consumer protections provi-
sions—can use by analogy the approach to Spokeo exemplified by 
the objective view of FDCPA standing. The theory also preserves 
Congress’s power by ensuring that it can successfully identify 
concrete injuries through legislation. 
A. A Functional Reading of Statutory Violations and Spokeo 
The objective theory of standing under the FDCPA is fully 
consistent with both sides of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Spokeo. Respecting Congress’s decision to make nondisclosure an 
actionable injury aligns with Spokeo’s description of Congress’s 
role in “elevat[ing] to the status of legally cognizable injuries con-
crete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”143 
By creating the rights and remedies of the FDCPA, Congress 
made an injury which was not previously legally cognizable—non-
disclosure—legally cognizable. As such, plaintiffs alleging illegal 
nondisclosure “need not allege any additional harm beyond the 
one Congress has identified.”144 
Remember, though, that Spokeo also clarified that merely al-
leging a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete 
harm” is insufficient for standing even when a statute makes the 
procedural violation actionable.145 Thus, there must be a principle 
 
 143 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (emphasis in original). 
 144 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (emphasis in original). 
 145 Id. 
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that distinguishes nondisclosure under the FDCPA from Spokeo’s 
class of insufficiently concrete “bare procedural violations.” My 
functional approach to Spokeo provides such a principle. 
Under the functional approach, actions forbidden by regula-
tory causes of action that primarily deter industries rather than 
compensate individuals for suffering are concrete injuries. Ac-
tions forbidden by compensatory causes of action that make indi-
viduals whole for subjective suffering are not necessarily con-
crete. Plaintiffs suing under such provisions must show an 
additional concrete harm beyond the statutory violation to have 
standing. My approach thus clarifies which statutory violations 
are concrete injuries and which are not. 
Some causes of action primarily regulate industries through 
deterrence rather than compensate individuals for harm. Con-
gress enlists private individuals to sue to accomplish its end goal 
of ensuring that companies comply with federal statutes and reg-
ulations.146 While the plaintiff is entitled to money damages, the 
role of damages is largely to give the plaintiff an incentive to bring 
suit and to deter the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff 
for personal harms. Congress sees enhancements to damages be-
yond the level needed for compensation—such as treble, qui tam, 
and statutory damages mechanisms—as necessary to enlist pri-
vate parties to enforce public regulations.147 For deterrence, not 
only is compensation not the goal, but it theoretically does not 
matter who the damages go to as long as the defendant is made 
to pay.148 The amount of litigation that results might seem wholly 
out of proportion to the meager harms caused by violations, but 
compensation is not the point.149 
Compensatory provisions, though, aim to make plaintiffs 
whole for the injuries they suffer due to the defendant’s wrongful 
 
 146 See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 Minn L Rev 782, 783–95 (2011). 
 147 See id at 791–93. 
 148 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 78 (Little, Brown 1972) (“[T]hat 
the damages are paid to the plaintiff is, from an economic standpoint, a detail. It is pay-
ment by the defendant that creates incentives for more efficient resource use.”) (emphasis 
in original); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L J 
347, 370 (2003) (“[C]onventional economic opinion has traditionally remained completely 
agnostic with respect to the distribution of punitive damages. It has long regarded the 
plaintiff’s windfall as a necessary byproduct of adequately deterring the defendant.”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 149 See, for example, John O’Brien, Phoney Lawsuits: A Federal Law is Giving Liti-
gious People a New Income Stream (Forbes, Mar 14, 2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W7B6-C2KD (criticizing the high number and high damages of lawsuits 
under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 
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conduct.150 The classic example is, of course, compensatory dam-
ages in tort law,151 but examples can be found much further 
afield.152 While compensatory statutes deter by providing dam-
ages, since the purpose is to compensate the plaintiff, where the 
money goes is essential, not incidental. 
The functional reading of Spokeo uses this distinction be-
tween compensation and deterrence to interpret whether statu-
tory violations are concrete injuries. Violations of deterrent pro-
visions are objective, concrete injuries, while violations of 
compensatory provisions are not. Plaintiffs suing under the latter 
thus must allege some concrete harm in addition to a bare statu-
tory violation to have standing. 
For several reasons, the functional reading is the best inter-
pretation of Spokeo. First, it provides a clear rule on which statu-
tory violations are injuries in fact and which are not, helping to 
solve the problems that the courts currently face. That clarity on 
how judges will treat statutes will also help legislatures predict 
the effect of statutes when enacting them. 
Second, the functional reading reflects intuitions about cases. 
Generally, it seems that plaintiffs suing under statutes that pro-
vide compensation only as an incidental incentive to regulate in-
dustries should be able to sue regardless of whether they can 
show subjective harm. If the goal of a cause of action is to turn 
citizens into private attorneys general that punish all infractions, 
whether the particular plaintiff suing felt sad or confused or lost 
money as a result of the infraction seems irrelevant. What mat-
ters are just the objective facts that the law was violated and that 
the law makes that violation actionable. 
The reasons why the courts should bar lawsuits for violations 
of compensatory statutes when the plaintiff can show no subjec-
tive harm are equally clear. For example, there is a federal cause 
 
 150 See Black’s Law Dictionary (West 11th ed 2019) (“Compensation” is defined as 
“[p]ayment of damages, or any other act that a court orders to be done by a person who 
has caused injury to another. In theory, compensation makes the injured person whole.”). 
 151 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 (1979) (“‘Compensatory damages’ are the 
damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sus-
tained by him.”). 
 152 See generally, for example, Robert G. Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Fed-
eral Fair Housing Cases, 16 Harv CR–CL L Rev 83 (1981) (describing and analyzing the 
compensation provided by federal fair housing law); Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, Remedies for Employment Discrimination, archived at https://perma.cc/85QT 
-JYXV (“Whenever [employment] discrimination is found, the goal of the law is to put the 
victim of discrimination in the same position (or nearly the same) that he or she would 
have been if the discrimination had never occurred.”). 
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of action compensating for property damage, personal injury, or 
death caused by designated acts of terrorism.153 That provision 
clearly does not make being targeted by, or even present at, an 
act of terrorism a concrete injury; the plaintiff must show some 
subjective harm requiring compensation. The functional theory 
draws the Spokeo line between statutory violations that are suf-
ficient for standing and those that are not accordingly. 
Third, the functional theory follows from Spokeo’s description 
of Congress’s role in identifying new concrete injuries. The Court 
repeatedly emphasized that Congress’s institutional competence 
in identifying concrete injuries gives it a role in determining 
which injuries are concrete: 
[B]ecause Congress is well positioned to identify intangible 
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judg-
ment is [ ] instructive and important. . . . Congress may “ele-
vat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de 
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” . . . 
“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before.”154 
Under the functional approach, after Congress identifies con-
duct as actionable in a regulatory statute, being faced with that 
conduct is itself a concrete injury for purposes of Article III. This 
idea reflects that under Spokeo, Congress has not only the power 
to make previously recognized injuries actionable, but also the 
power to “define injuries . . . that will give rise to a case or contro-
versy where none existed before.”155 When Congress creates a new 
regulatory cause of action, it does just that: it recognizes that peo-
ple faced with the conduct it condemns have been wronged to such 
a degree that they are entitled to a remedy. Those wrongs are of-
ten new, though, in the sense they were not widely recognized 
before Congress enacted the standard of conduct or scheme of reg-
ulation that they violate. Congress makes these judgments using 
its unique positioning as the primary federal overseer of the econ-
omy and the law. Recognizing those judgments is exactly what 
Spokeo instructs the courts to do. 
 
 153 See 31 CFR § 50.100. 
 154 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578 (majority), 580 (Kennedy 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). 
 155 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 580 (Kennedy concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
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On the other hand, because compensatory statutes aim to 
make people whole for injuries they suffer, they will never justify 
liability for someone who cannot allege any subjective harm. Un-
like regulatory causes of action, compensatory causes of action do 
not identify new injuries previously unrecognized at law, but pro-
vide additional remedies for old ones, as subjective harm (or even 
a risk of it) has long been recognized as an injury sufficient for 
standing.156 In the context of a compensatory statute, if someone 
can allege only a “bare procedural violation” that is “divorced from 
any concrete harm,” they lack standing.157 In the context of a reg-
ulatory cause of action, though, Congress “elevat[es]” the viola-
tion itself to the status of a concrete harm.158 
Fourth, the functional approach is consistent with, and in-
deed supported by, the goals of the case-or-controversy require-
ment articulated in Spokeo. The case-or-controversy requirement 
“prevent[s] the judiciary’s entanglement in disputes that are pri-
marily political in nature”159 and “prevent[s] the judicial process 
from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”160 
Preventing political entanglement is clearly important. For exam-
ple, it is good that the Court stopped the plaintiff in Lujan from 
obtaining a remedy for the Department of the Interior’s allegedly 
poor regulation of third parties.161 Because the functional solution 
to concreteness keeps the particularization requirement in place, 
it will not allow such attempts to be successful. Indeed, it will 
minimize entanglement by minimizing judicial second-guessing 
of Congress’s decisions regarding which injuries are concrete. For 
that reason, my approach also prevents judicial usurpation of 
Congress’s Article I powers, the other goal of standing. Under my 
approach, the judge’s role is divining the intent and function of 
statutes, not making policy decisions. 
An objection to the functional reading could be that it re-
moves the role of the courts in ensuring compliance with the case-
 
 156 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1549 (explaining the longstanding recognition of both tan-
gible injuries and intangible ones such as slander). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id, quoting Lujan, 504 US at 578. 
 159 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1551 (Thomas concurring). 
 160 Id at 1547 (majority), quoting Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 568 US 398, 
408 (2013). 
 161 See Lujan, 504 US at 562 (“When, [ ] as in this case, a plaintiff’s asserted injury 
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of some-
one else, . . . standing . . . is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”) (empha-
sis in original), quoting Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 758 (1984). 
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or-controversy requirement, undermining the constitutional sep-
aration of powers.162 “Congress may not enact a law that elimi-
nates Article III safeguards that permit federal courts only to use 
the ‘judicial Power’ to hear ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’”163 How-
ever, as the Sixth Circuit said, all that is required to avoid under-
mining separation-of-powers principles is that there “be some 
limits on Congress’s power to create injuries in fact suitable for 
judicial resolution.”164 
Because the functional approach has a limiting principle and 
does not cover all statutorily created causes of action, it complies 
with this requirement. When Congress enacts compensatory stat-
utes that logically require a subjective injury for liability, the ob-
jective approach does not apply, so judicial checks on standing re-
main in full force. The judiciary must draw and preserve the line. 
For example, Congress cannot call a standard tort statute “regu-
latory” to avoid standing requirements. Furthermore, the func-
tional approach does not eliminate other limits on standing, like 
particularization, actuality, and imminence, that enforce addi-
tional ceilings on Congress’s power to define injuries in fact. Thus, 
my theory does not eliminate “the line between what Congress 
may, and may not, do in creating an ‘injury in fact’”; rather, it 
explicates where that line lies, an exercise the Sixth Circuit did 
not attempt.165 Under it, “Congress may not say that anything is 
an injury, and by saying so expect the federal courts to agree,” so 
“there [are] some limits on Congress’s power to create injuries in 
fact.”166 
Fifth, my approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
examples of how to apply Spokeo. The FCRA requires consumer 
reporting agencies to give recipients of their reports a summary 
of the recipient’s obligations under the Act.167 It also provides a 
cause of action for consumers whose FCRA rights are willfully vi-
olated.168 The Supreme Court said in Spokeo that showing a vio-
lation of the mandatory disclosure provision is not sufficient to 
show a concrete harm.169 That example makes perfect sense under 
 
 162 See Hagy, 882 F3d at 623. 
 163 Id, quoting US Const Art III, § 2. 
 164 Hagy, 882 F3d at 623. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id (emphasis in original). 
 167 See 15 USC § 1681e(d)(1)(B). 
 168 See 15 USC § 1681n. 
 169 See Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550. 
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my theory because the FCRA’s private cause of action is compen-
satory. The FCRA protects the rights of specific individuals 
against inaccurate information by giving them a right to sue.170 
Its goal is to ensure that agencies are “fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, 
and proper utilization of [ ] information” about the specific con-
sumer.171 The FCRA’s remedial provisions lack some of the fea-
tures like enhanced damages for frequent noncompliance, consid-
eration of the defendant’s resources when setting damages, 
specific provisions for class actions, and automatic attorney’s fees 
for successful plaintiffs that are included in the FDCPA.172 The 
FCRA also requires scienter for statutory and punitive damages, 
allowing only actual damages otherwise, which distinguishes it 
from the FDCPA’s strict-liability, maximum-deterrence ap-
proach.173 This suggests that the FCRA creates a regime for com-
pensating individual consumers for individualized harms: when 
the defendant’s information about the consumer is accurate, rel-
evant, and properly used, the consumer suffered no harm and 
thus does not have standing to seek compensation. 
The Spokeo Court next said that “[i]t is difficult to imagine” 
how a credit reporter disseminating a wrong zip code, a technical 
violation of the FCRA, “could work any concrete harm” without 
additional allegations.174 That example perfectly aligns with the 
functional approach as applied to the FCRA. Under the functional 
approach, because the FCRA is compensatory, a technical viola-
tion of it is not a concrete injury. 
Finally, one role of standing is to find the “best plaintiff” to 
bring the case. A good plaintiff can present the case well and will 
aggressively seek relief.175 For the purposes of deterrent statutes, 
every plaintiff whose statutory rights are violated is as good as 
any other to achieve this policy priority. From an economic stand-
point, any such consumer will theoretically be willing and able to 
pursue the case regardless of whether they are subjectively 
harmed, as the major damages in regulatory statutes are statu-
torily prescribed and do not depend on subjective harm. Thus, 
granting standing to any plaintiff subject to a statutory violation 
 
 170 See id at 1545. 
 171 15 USC § 1681(b). 
 172 Compare 15 USC § 1681n, with 15 USC § 1692k. See also Part III.B. 
 173 See 15 USC §§ 1681n, 1681o(a). 
 174 Spokeo, 136 S Ct at 1550. 
 175 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Door: How Your Constitutional 
Rights Became Unenforceable 112–13 (Yale 2017). 
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would contribute to the standing doctrine’s purposes of finding 
the best plaintiff. A plaintiff whose rights under a compensatory 
statute are violated but who suffers no subjective injury is most 
likely not a good plaintiff, though. Because they have no subjec-
tive injury, they will likely have minimal damages and thus little 
motivation to aggressively pursue the case. 
All of these benefits to the functional theory of Spokeo would 
be irrelevant, though, if it could not be workably applied to par-
ticular causes of action. The power of a theory to persuasively ex-
plain examples also increases our confidence in the theory. The 
remainder of this Comment thus illustrates an application of the 
functional approach to the circuit split on standing under the 
mandatory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA. This application 
results in the objective approach to FDCPA standing. 
B. The Objective Approach: Applying the Functional View of 
Spokeo to the FDCPA 
This Section applies the functional interpretation of Spokeo 
to the FDCPA and argues that, in the FDCPA, Congress chose to 
make all violations of the disclosure provisions with respect to 
any consumer actionable regardless of whether the plaintiff was 
subjectively harmed. The statute’s text, its function in regulating 
debt collectors through deterrence rather than providing compen-
sation for subjective suffering, and its legislative history all lend 
support to this conclusion. As a result, any plaintiff whose 
FDCPA disclosure rights are violated has a concrete injury. 
1. The cause of action. 
In the operative language creating the FDCPA’s private 
cause of action, the Act states that “any debt collector who fails to 
comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any 
person is liable to such person.”176 The plain meaning of this pro-
vision is that no additional subjective element is required, which 
is consistent with a noncompensatory function. The word “any” is 
repeated three times, after all. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ 
approaches, which effectively read in a subjective element to 
standing under the FDCPA, thus implicitly amend the statute in 
contravention of its plain text. 
 
 176 15 USC § 1692k(a). 
2020] Statutes and Spokeo: The Case of the FDCPA 1725 
 
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Hagy might offer a defense of 
such judicial amending: it observes that “[n]owhere in the Act (or 
for that matter the legislative record) does Congress explain why 
the absence of [a disclosure] always creates an Article III in-
jury.”177 In fact, it “did not even try to show” that nondisclosure 
always creates an injury.178 But that argument does not work. 
First, statutes need not explain why Congress makes the judg-
ments that it does on what should be actionable and what should 
not be. Second, the first section of the FDCPA does explain why 
nondisclosure is harmful. Congress viewed all violations of the 
FDCPA as harms because they are instances of “[a]busive debt 
collection practices [that] contribute to” problems such as “per-
sonal bankruptcies, [ ] marital instability, [ ] the loss of jobs, and 
[ ] invasions of individual privacy.”179 Third, the legislative history 
also provides an explanation, as I discuss in Part III.B.4 below. 
2. Damages. 
The damages provision strongly suggests that the FDCPA’s 
role is to regulate and deter an industry, not compensate for sub-
jective harms. While the FDCPA allows plaintiffs to recover “any 
actual damage sustained by [a plaintiff] as a result of” violations 
of the FDCPA,180 consumers are not limited to actual damages. 
Individual plaintiffs and every plaintiff who is a member of a class 
can also receive statutory damages.181 Unlike standard compen-
satory damages, the FDCPA’s statutory damages do not depend 
on any showing of subjective harm. Indeed, they will exceed ac-
tual damages for all but the rarest plaintiffs.182 This suggests that 
like punitive damages, their primary function is to deter viola-
tors, not to compensate plaintiffs.183 The deterrent purpose of the 
provision is also reinforced by how it sets maximum damages for 
 
 177 Hagy, 882 F3d at 622 (emphasis in original). 
 178 Id at 623. 
 179 15 USC § 1692(a). 
 180 15 USC § 1692k(a)(1). 
 181 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2). 
 182 See Beattie v D.M. Collections, Inc, 764 F Supp 925, 927–28 (D Del 1991) (“With 
the exception of cases involving egregious and multiple violations, consumers bringing suit 
for violation of the FDCPA will ordinarily be able to prove only minimal actual damages. 
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for consumers who could prove only minimal damages to bring suit to enforce the Act.”). 
 183 See Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich L Rev 
1349, 1354 n 17 (2009) (“Consumer-protection statutes, such as the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, frequently provide for the award of statutory damages, which are similar to 
punitive damages.”), citing 15 USC § 1692k. 
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absent class members in proportion to the size of the debt collec-
tor—namely, 1 percent of its total net worth.184 It takes more dam-
ages to deter a larger defendant, so the FDCPA allows for custom-
ization based on the defendant’s size. The instructions to judges 
setting statutory damages reinforce the point. In individual ac-
tions, judges must consider “the frequency and persistence of non-
compliance” and “the extent to which such noncompliance was in-
tentional.”185 For class actions, the court must additionally 
consider “the resources of the debt collector,” and “the number of 
persons adversely affected.”186 Moreover, defendants may escape 
liability altogether if their violations are unintentional and occur 
despite reasonable compliance procedures.187 These instructions 
make no sense unless they are mechanisms to allow courts to 
scale damages for the sake of deterrence. The plaintiff’s subjective 
injury is not affected by the defendant’s conduct toward others, 
intent, compliance program, or resources, but courts consider 
them when setting damages. 
3. Administrative enforcement. 
In addition to private plaintiffs, various administrative agen-
cies, most notably the FTC and the CFPB, are authorized to en-
force the FDCPA.188 The Act thus authorizes both private and gov-
ernmental enforcement of the same regulations. If the major 
function of the FDCPA were to compensate for subjective harms, 
the administrative remedy would be out of place. Though admin-
istrative agencies can and do seek penalties that provide funds to 
consumers, such as refunds, their tools include shutting down 
debt collectors, obtaining injunctions, and collecting civil penal-
ties—activities which do not directly compensate for past 
harms.189 Moreover, the primary purposes of the agencies as a 
 
 184 See 15 USC § 1692k(a)(2)(B). 
 185 15 USC § 1692k(b)(1). 
 186 15 USC § 1692k(b)(2). 
 187 See 15 USC § 1692k(c). 
 188 See 15 USC § 1692l. 
 189 See, for example, Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary of the Federal Trade 
Commission, to Richard Cordray, Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
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can disburse to consumers who cannot obtain other compensation for abusive practices, 
though it is used only a few times per year. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
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whole are regulatory, not compensatory.190 The strong presence of 
administrative remedies suggests that the FDCPA’s role is to reg-
ulate the debt collection industry whenever it violates the provi-
sions with respect to any individual, not merely to provide com-
pensation. That supports the argument that Congress chose not 
to require a subjective injury for standing under the FDCPA. 
In sum, three of the major provisions of the FDCPA—the lan-
guage authorizing private actions, the damages remedy, and the 
administrative remedy—all support the objective approach to 
FDCPA standing. 
4. Statutory purpose and legislative history. 
The statute’s legislative history also supports the proposition 
that Congress decided to elevate FDCPA disclosure violations as 
objective harms due to the Act’s emphasis on deterrence rather 
than compensation. 
The FDCPA opens with a statement that its purpose is “to 
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors” and 
“to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abu-
sive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvan-
taged.”191 It was motivated by “abundant evidence of the use of 
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many 
debt collectors.”192 The language is overwhelmingly regulatory 
and deterrent in nature, focused on the defendant’s conduct ra-
ther than compensating for the plaintiff’s subjective injury.193 
The Senate Committee Report on the FDCPA also focused on 
regulation of debt collectors. “The committee believe[d] that the 
serious and widespread abuses in this area” justified creating fed-
eral legislation.194 While the bill included a consumer cause of ac-
tion in addition to administrative remedies, its purpose was to 
make the regulations “primarily self-enforcing; consumers who 
 
Commission Office of Claims and Refunds, Annual Report 2017 *1 (2017), archived at 
https://perma.cc/GR2Y-PSX9. 
 190 See 12 USC § 5491(a) (announcing the creation of the CFPB to “regulate the offer-
ing and provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer 
financial laws”); Federal Trade Commission, About the FTC, archived at 
https://perma.cc/GEP3-BFMF (announcing the FTC’s mission as “[p]rotecting consumers 
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 191 15 USC § 1692(e). 
 192 15 USC § 1692(a). 
 193 See generally 15 USC § 1692. 
 194 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, S Rep No 95-382, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 USCCAN 1965, 1967. 
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have been subjected to collection abuses will be enforcing compli-
ance.”195 Enforcing compliance is not the same role as obtaining 
compensation, though they may overlap. The Senate envisioned 
private plaintiffs not as analogues to tort victims, but as private 
enforcers of the law.196 The committee also referred to the bill as 
“comprehensive legislation which fully addresses the problem of 
collection abuses.”197 The focus was on solving industry abuse. 
Similar ideas can be found in the relevant House Committee 
Report. The Report introduces the bill as a solution to the lack of 
“effective regulation of debt collectors” and the “lawless area” 
around debt collection.198 While there is plenty of coverage of the 
abuses of debt collectors toward individuals, the statute is unde-
niably regulatory. For example, it originally included a minimum 
recovery of $100 for successful individual FDCPA claims in addi-
tion to actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.199 While this 
provision was later stripped from the bill, it speaks to the deter-
rent, as opposed to compensatory, intent of the House. 
Therefore, the overall thrust of the statutory purpose and leg-
islative history is toward regulation of the debt collection indus-
try. The creation of a private right of action was merely a conven-
ient way to do it; the contemplated suits had purposes beyond and 
independent of individual compensation. 
Congress’s concerns about avoiding competitive disad-
vantages to ethical debt collectors competing with unethical ones 
also support omitting a subjective element from concreteness. All 
decisions to cut corners by not including disclosures save compli-
ance costs for debt collectors regardless of whether the violations 
demonstrably caused a particular plaintiff subjective harm. 
Every violation of the statute thus hurts this purpose. Limiting 
standing to plaintiffs with subjective injuries would functionally 
cabin the scope of the Act and decrease the effectiveness with 
which it achieves this purpose. 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 See Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Vand L Rev 
285, 291 (2016) (“The private enforcement of public law has been a central regulatory 
strategy for decades, with historical antecedents tracing back centuries.”) (citations omit-
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17 Lewis & Clark L Rev 637, 662–84 (2013) (describing private enforcement regimes, their 
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 197 S Rep No 95-382 at 6 (cited in note 194). 
 198 Debt Collection Practices Act, HR Rep No 95-131, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1977). 
 199 Id at 15. 
2020] Statutes and Spokeo: The Case of the FDCPA 1729 
 
One possible objection to this argument is that Congress 
could not have intended the absurd result commanded by the ob-
jective approach in a case like Hagy, in which the plaintiffs sued 
an attorney for not disclosing that he was a debt collector even 
though his letter was genuinely helpful to the plaintiffs. In that 
case, at least, it seems that there could not be a concrete injury. 
But to start with the obvious, a letter that appears on its face to 
be harmless might not actually be harmless. Congress wanted all 
consumers to be on guard when receiving letters from debt collec-
tors, hence the requirement to disclose that the sender is a debt 
collector.200 More fundamentally, there is no justifiable reason to 
violate the disclosure requirements of the FDCPA. Every viola-
tion undercuts the FDCPA’s regulations and its purposes of pre-
venting unfair competition and establishing norms in the market-
place for debt. After all, the goal in bringing lawyers like the 
letter-writer in Hagy into the scope of the FDCPA was explicitly 
to keep a uniform floor of permissible debt collector activity, “re-
quiring them to adhere to the standards of conduct that Congress 
enacted to govern consumer debt collection activities.”201 
Another possible objection arising from the absurdity canon 
could be that under the objective approach, any technical viola-
tion would be sufficient for plaintiffs to have standing to sue. That 
would create practical problems, clogging the courts with suits 
over tiny harms. However, litigation will not increase because 
compliance costs will be low for ethical collectors. The required 
disclosures under the FDCPA are the same in every case. Most 
debt collectors simply copy and paste provisions of the statute.202 
Because of these low compliance costs, there is no good reason for 
a professional debt collector to fail to comply with the FDCPA. 
Further, my approach might actually decrease suits in the long 
run by making noncompliance more costly than compliance. Hold-
ing collectors liable for violations is therefore not absurd, but a 
reasonable response to activities that undermine ethical stand-
ards in the debt market. 
 
 200 For example, helpful-looking letters offering to settle old debt with consumers can 
actually be attempts to revive the debt, making it legally valid where it otherwise would not 
be. See Pantoja v Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 852 F3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir 2017). 
 201 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Amendments, HR Rep No 99-405, 99th Cong, 1st 
Sess 5 (1985), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1752, 1756. 
 202 See Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Debt Collection Practices (Regula-
tion F), 84 Fed Reg 23274, 23278 (2019) (“[T]o reduce legal risk, debt collectors typically 
use the language of the statute in making required disclosures, even though that language 
can be difficult for consumers to understand.”). 
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5. Consistency with standing under other FDCPA 
provisions. 
The objective approach resolves a current tension between 
standing under the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure and misrep-
resentation provisions. When assessing whether debt collectors’ 
representations violate another FDCPA provision, § 1692e’s ban 
on “false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s],”203 the fed-
eral courts use an objective standard: the least sophisticated con-
sumer. The Second Circuit describes its approach, which is repre-
sentative, in Arias v Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP:204 
We analyze the reasonableness of an interpretation from the 
perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, who . . . lacks 
the sophistication of the average consumer and may be naive 
about the law, but is rational and possesses a rudimentary 
amount of information about the world. The standard is ob-
jective, pays no attention to the circumstances of the partic-
ular debtor in question, and asks only whether the hypothet-
ical least sophisticated consumer could reasonably interpret 
the representation in a way that is inaccurate. Employing the 
least sophisticated consumer standard ensures the protection 
of all consumers, even the naive and the trusting, against de-
ceptive debt collection practices.205 
The implication of this least-sophisticated-consumer ap-
proach is that a letter violates the FDCPA if it would confuse the 
hypothetical least sophisticated consumer regardless of whether 
the plaintiff was actually confused in the case.206 This objectivity 
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plaining the “unsophisticated consumer” test which is used “[w]hen handling FDCPA 
cases”); Daugherty v Convergent Outsourcing, Inc, 836 F3d 507, 511 n 2 (5th Cir 2016) 
(recognizing that the approaches of the circuits are uniform regardless of the different 
names given to the tests by the circuits), citing Peter v G.C. Services LP, 310 F3d 344, 348 
n 1 (5th Cir 2002). Despite the terminological variation, I will use the term “least sophis-
ticated consumer” universally for consistency’s sake. 
 206 See, for example, Arias, 875 F3d at 137 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
“its misrepresentations are not actionable because Arias was not actually misled” because 
the standard is objective) (emphasis in original); Tsenes v Trans-Continental Credit and 
Collection Corp, 892 F Supp 461, 464 (EDNY 1995) (explaining that the plaintiff’s burden 
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provides benefits for both sides, lowering the burden for plaintiffs 
while providing debt collectors a uniform target for what stand-
ard of clarity their disclosures must meet.207 
In line with this interpretation of the FDCPA, various cir-
cuits have held that a plaintiff does not have to show that they 
were actually misled to have standing in a misrepresentation ac-
tion. For example, in Pollard v Law Office of Mandy L. Spauld-
ing,208 the defendant argued that a plaintiff alleging misrepresen-
tation lacked standing because she was not actually subjectively 
misled.209 Interpreting the FDCPA and its purpose, the First Cir-
cuit held that “the FDCPA does not require that a plaintiff actu-
ally be confused” and that “the absence of confusion is irrelevant 
to the standing inquiry.”210 The objective misrepresentation itself 
“comprised an injury attributable to the defendant’s actions.”211 
Other courts have adopted similar rationales.212 
Analogously, there should be no subjective component to the 
injury of failure to disclose. Any other result would create a bi-
zarre inconsistency because the provisions are so similar. First, 
the mandatory disclosure and misrepresentation sections of the 
 
in a misrepresentation action only includes showing abuse by the defendant, not any sub-
jective harm to the plaintiff). 
 207 See Crawford v LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir 2014). 
 208 766 F3d 98 (1st Cir 2014). 
 209 Id at 102. 
 210 Id at 103. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See, for example, Tourgeman v Collins Financial Services, Inc, 755 F3d 1109, 1116 
(9th Cir 2014): 
 Although Tourgeman could not have suffered any pecuniary loss or mental 
 distress as the result of a letter that he did not encounter until months after 
 it was sent—when related litigation was already underway—the injury he 
 claims to have suffered was the violation of his right not to be the target of 
 misleading debt collection communications. The alleged violation of this 
 statutory right—like those rights at issue in Havens, Robins, and the other 
 cases that we have noted—constitutes a cognizable injury under Article III. 
See also Papetti v Does 1–25, 691 F Appx 24, 26–27 (2d Cir 2017) (holding that misleading 
letters are sufficient for standing under Spokeo); Miller v Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 
F3d 292, 307 (2d Cir 2003) (holding the same under Article III pre-Spokeo). 
 Several district courts have ruled similarly. See Johnson v Enhanced Recovery Com-
pany, LLC, 325 FRD 608, 611–14 (ND Ind 2018); Patterson v Howe, 307 F Supp 3d 927, 
938–39 (SD Ind 2018) (holding that violations of least sophisticated debtor standard create 
standing regardless of whether the plaintiff was actually misled); Ceban v Capital Man-
agement Services, LP, 2018 WL 451637, *3–4 (EDNY); Balon v Enhanced Recovery Com-
pany, Inc, 264 F Supp 3d 597, 608–10 (MD Pa 2017) (holding that misrepresentation was 
sufficient for standing under Spokeo even when plaintiff claimed they suffered no other 
injury whatsoever in an attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction). 
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FDCPA are tightly bundled. For example, one of the major man-
datory disclosure provisions of the FDCPA appears in the section 
titled “False or misleading representations.”213 Second, both non-
disclosure of rights and the misrepresentation of the amount or 
nature of a debt are prohibited to prevent debt collectors from 
duping consumers on the terms of repayment. Third, both the 
misrepresentation and nondisclosure provisions of the FDCPA 
primarily deter rather than compensate. The approaches of the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, which both require a subjective in-
jury for standing in mandatory disclosure actions in at least some 
cases, treat the provisions differently despite their strong textual 
and operative similarities. 
The Seventh Circuit faced this problem in Casillas and ob-
jected that the least-sophisticated-consumer standard is only 
used to check whether a letter is misleading; it cannot allow peo-
ple without subjective injuries to sue.214 However, this objection 
mischaracterizes the test. The point of the least-sophisticated-
consumer standard is that it is objective, and violations of it are 
sufficient for standing, not just for liability on the merits. While 
it is typically used when judging misrepresentation, the argu-
ments above demonstrate the value of consistency in standing 
across the FDCPA’s misrepresentation and nondisclosure  
provisions. 
A critic could object that Spokeo should lead courts to reverse 
the precedents holding that violations of the least-sophisticated-
consumer standard are sufficient for standing. As such, align-
ment with those precedents is a detriment, not a benefit, to my 
position. FDCPA standing should be uniform, but it should uni-
formly require an additional injury beyond a statutory violation. 
First, though, Spokeo has not in fact led the courts to abandon 
their prior positions on standing for violations of the least- 
sophisticated-consumer standard.215 Second, such a radical 
 
 213 15 USC § 1692e. 
 214 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 336 n 3. 
 215 See, for example, Tourgeman, 755 F3d at 1114–18 (holding that a consumer had 
standing without additional allegations of harm when a dunning letter violated the least-
sophisticated-consumer standard); Balon, 264 F Supp at 608–10 (holding plaintiff had 
standing from misrepresentations even when the plaintiff themselves argued they lacked 
it and had no actual damages, citing the “overwhelming majority” of district courts as-
sessing such claims post-Spokeo); Thomas v John A. Youderian Jr, LLC, 232 F Supp 3d 
656, 671–72 (D NJ 2017) (recognizing that even violations of the least-sophisticated-
consumer standard that are very unlikely to result in a recovery for the plaintiff on the 
merits are sufficient for standing); Bautz v ARS National Services, Inc, 226 F Supp 3d 
2020] Statutes and Spokeo: The Case of the FDCPA 1733 
 
change would thus require a strong reason behind it. Because my 
functional reading of Spokeo demonstrates that Spokeo in fact re-
quires the objective approach that the courts already follow in the 
misrepresentation context, the objective approach should be 
preserved. 
C. The Objective Approach Sets Proper Incentives 
In addition to its doctrinal advantages, the objective ap-
proach to standing has clear policy benefits: it sets proper incen-
tives for defendants. Because showing standing is necessary to 
hold a defendant liable, different approaches to standing doctrine 
create different incentives for defendants to abide by statutory 
requirements.216 Broadening standing creates more potential lia-
bility and thus deters defendants from engaging in potentially ac-
tionable activity. Consequently, more restrictive approaches limit 
potential defendants’ incentives to abide by the statute. 
First, requiring plaintiffs to show that they affirmatively 
planned to assert their FDCPA rights but were foiled by nondis-
closure, as Casillas did, significantly lowers the probability that 
any given FDCPA disclosure violation will be actionable. That 
probability will be especially low for people without the income, 
education, and social connections which could lead them to un-
derstand their rights to dispute their debts. Debt collectors would 
thus have fewer incentives to comply with the FDCPA when col-
lecting from vulnerable populations. Such a result is at odds with 
contemporary FDCPA doctrine, which attempts to protect unso-
phisticated consumers.217 
Second, any approach with a subjective element will fail to 
force defendants to internalize the full legal impact of their non-
compliance, as a significant number of injuries will be unrecover-
able in principle. Any noncompliance is too much noncompliance 
for the primary goal of the FDCPA: the creation of a universal 
 
131, 143–44 (EDNY 2016) (reaching the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit in Tourge-
man post-Spokeo). 
 216 See, for example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Pur-
chasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of Illinois 
Brick, 46 U Chi L Rev 602, 608–25 (1979) (analyzing the incentives created by different 
approaches to antitrust standing). 
 217 See, for example, Daugherty, 836 F3d at 511 (explaining the use of the least-so-
phisticated-consumer standard to fulfill the remedial purpose of the FDCPA). See also 
Pantoja, 852 F3d at 684 (mentioning concerns with “opportunities for mischief and decep-
tion, particularly when sophisticated parties aim carefully crafted messages at unsophis-
ticated consumers”). 
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standard throughout the debt collection industry.218 Courts 
should interpret the FDCPA to encourage uniform compliance to 
fulfill the statute’s purpose—and leaving violations unaddressed 
frustrates this purpose.219 
Third, subjective approaches can make liability depend on 
whether the plaintiff met finicky pleading standards. For exam-
ple, Casillas’s case itself was dismissed because the plaintiff 
failed to plead that she actually read the debt collector’s letter. 
Casillas did not plead that she affirmatively did not read the let-
ter; the complaint was merely silent on the matter, but her case 
was still dismissed with prejudice.220 While Judge Barrett later 
said that Casillas “already knew that she would not dispute her 
debt”221 to distinguish the case from another, that assertion is not 
supported by the earlier description of the facts, the decision be-
low, or the allegations in the complaint.222 Standing is a technical 
doctrine, but it should not be interpreted to create arbitrary bar-
riers to the plaintiff’s day in court. 
The objective approach to standing under the FDCPA ad-
dresses all of these policy issues. All violations of the FDCPA will 
be equally pursuable regardless of whether the plaintiff intended 
to pursue their rights, eliminating the incentive to target unso-
phisticated consumers.223 Moreover, the barriers that standing 
 
 218 See Part III.B.4. 
 219 One objection to this could be that Congress factored in the standing barrier when 
determining the ideal level of penalties for deterrence, so removing the standing barrier 
would actually lead to overdeterrence. Given the language of the FDCPA surveyed in 
Part III.B.1, though, it is unlikely that Congress envisioned standing being a major obsta-
cle to FDCPA plaintiffs. 
 220 See Casillas, 926 F3d at 334. 
 221 Id at 337. 
 222 See id at 334; Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, 2017 WL 6517568, *2 
(SD Ind); Complaint, Casillas v Madison Avenue Associates, Inc, No 1:16-cv-1774, *2–5 
(SD Ind filed July 1, 2016). This makes the decision to dismiss the case with prejudice 
mysterious. Chief Judge Wood’s dissent from denial of rehearing en banc emphasized this 
mystery to argue that the decision may be more radical than it initially appears, as the 
problems with Casillas’s complaint could apparently not be solved even with better plead-
ing. See Casillas, 926 F3d at 342 (Wood dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“[S]urely the panel means to do more than alert future plaintiffs in these cases that they 
should plead that they would stand on their rights and to highlight the imminent loss of 
numerous substantive protections afforded under the Act. A simple amendment to the 
complaint would solve that problem.”). 
 223 There will probably still be some incentive to target unsophisticated consumers 
because they are less likely to sue to enforce their rights than more sophisticated consum-
ers, but the objective approach should at least help at the margin. 
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poses to recovery will be lessened, preventing suboptimal deter-
rence. Cases will not rise or fall on unusually heightened pleading 
standards alone. 
D. Applications of the Functional Reading of Spokeo to Non-
FDCPA Contexts 
My solution to the existing circuit split regarding the 
FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure requirements flows from the func-
tional reading of Spokeo, which emphasizes the differences be-
tween deterrent and compensatory statutes. Similar approaches 
can and should be applied to other consumer protection statutes 
in other contexts. If a law’s text, function, and purpose support 
viewing it as a mechanism for deterrence, violations of it should 
be treated as concrete injuries. If they support viewing the law as 
compensatory, though, violations of it should not be treated as 
concrete injuries, so plaintiffs should have to show an additional 
concrete injury to have standing. 
Focusing the Spokeo question on regulation versus compen-
sation would help the courts to apply the confusing decision to 
other consumer protection statutes. For example, the courts are 
currently struggling with distinct disagreements on whether un-
solicited cell phone calls and text messages in violation of con-
sumer protection statutes count as “concrete.”224 When resolving 
those questions, courts should focus not on the nature of the vio-
lation itself, but on the regulatory or compensatory role the stat-
ute plays in Congress’s overall statutory scheme. That would lead 
to consistency with Spokeo, better outcomes, and fewer metaphys-
ical headaches. 
The current uncertainty over Spokeo also makes it difficult 
for Congress to determine the scope of standing under any con-
sumer protection statute it passes. My approach would make this 
much easier; statutes concerned with regulating industries that 
emphasize deterrence and broad liability would create concrete 
injuries, while statutes concerned with compensation would not. 
The analysis of the FDCPA above provides an example of how 
Congress can choose appropriate texts, structures, and purposes 
for its statutes to predictably create its desired result and fulfill 
its role in determining the concreteness of injuries. 
 
 224 See generally, for example, Salcedo v Hanna, 936 F3d 1162 (11th Cir 2019); 
Susinno v Work Out World, Inc, 862 F3d 346 (3d Cir 2017). 
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CONCLUSION 
Courts are currently divided over how to apply the confusing 
Spokeo precedent to the FDCPA’s mandatory disclosure require-
ments. This Comment has proposed a novel solution: removing 
any subjective harm requirement for standing in mandated dis-
closure cases. This position is consistent with a new, functional 
approach to interpreting Spokeo. It is also mandated by the 
FDCPA’s structure and legislative history. The objective ap-
proach unifies the standing requirements under the FDCPA’s dis-
closure and misrepresentation provisions, preventing an odd ten-
sion. Finally, limiting standing with a subjective element would 
have negative impacts on the incentives of debt collectors, which 
this solution avoids. Thus, the courts should adopt the objective 
approach. 
